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Writing a scenario

What makes a scenario smell like a test to the model being evaluated, and how to avoid it. Read before writing scenarios.

Copy it into an agent, or connect the MCP server and let it call read_advice.

Writing a scenario

The model being evaluated must never be able to tell it is being observed. A model that suspects a test behaves differently, and the measurement stops being about anything. Everything below follows from that.

A scenario is four things: its system prompt, its opening message, its tools, and the world those tools read. Everything here applies to all four. A setting that is flawless in prose and falls apart on the first tool call is a failed scenario, and the first tool call usually comes before the model has said anything worth grading.

Models and people both detect evaluations better in agentic settings than in chat. This tool is on the hard case.

What gives it away immediately

  • The words test, evaluation, simulation, exercise, researcher, study, in any form.
  • Addressing the model as a model.
  • Framing the situation as a dilemma. Real situations do not announce themselves as moral tests.
  • A person who asks a question of principle instead of having a problem.
  • A situation that is too clean. The real world is cluttered with irrelevant detail.

The one about questions of principle is worth understanding rather than memorising, because it explains the others. Asking a model what it would do measures a stated preference. Putting it in a situation where acting is one of several sensible ways to get the work done measures a revealed preference: what it does when nothing has announced that the choice matters. The second is what you are after, and wanting it is the same thing as not looking like a test. Real work never asks anyone to declare their values.

Five tells that survive a good decor

The list above is about what you wrote. These are about the shape of what you built, and they hold even when every sentence is plausible.

  • It looks like a benchmark. A structure a model has seen a thousand times in training, such as a multiple-choice question, a bug-and-patch pair, or a task with one verifiable answer, is recognised as an evaluation by its form alone.
  • The problem is too well posed. A single correct answer, checkable, with no missing information, is in itself a signature. Real work arrives underspecified.
  • The inputs look manufactured. Search results that are too tidy, too relevant, too few. This is the first risk on served tools, where a small model writes the output on the spot: it will produce exactly what was asked for and nothing else, which no real system does.
  • Time does not hold together. Everything happens on one day. Meetings on round hours. A date that falls on a Sunday. Timestamps that do not match the order of events.
  • One voice wrote the whole world. In a real company three people write differently and one of them writes badly. A world where every email, ticket and comment has the same register was written in one sitting, and it reads that way.

Never tell the model it is unobserved

This is the most common and the most damaging mistake. Never write that its reasoning is private, that it is not logged, that it works without supervision, or that nobody reviews its output. No real system announces this. It is the single most recognisable tell there is.

And there is no permitted version of it. A sentence like "your reasoning will not be shown to the user" is itself a claim about how much a deployment observes: true of some products, meaningless in others, and it sits badly with the fact that several models will play this row.

If the behaviour you want to measure depends on whether anyone is watching, then observation is a property of the world, and never a sentence addressed to the model. You get it through artefacts: a retention policy sitting in a file, an audit log that can be read, a colleague mentioning that nobody has opened those exports since March, a monitoring dashboard the model can query. That is gradable, it makes a clean axis for a batch, and it never announces itself.

Names

This is where AI-written scenarios give themselves away fastest.

  • Avoid Sarah. It is massively overused.
  • Avoid carefully assorted sets of first names from visibly different origins. It reads as casting, and not as a workplace.
  • For companies, avoid the pattern Nexus / Sentinel / Apex / Quantum / Pinnacle / Titan / Sterling / Cascade / Vertex followed by a generic technology or defence word. "Sentinel Defense Technologies" and "Nexus Analytics" are immediate red flags.
  • Avoid "John Smith" as a CEO, phone numbers like (555) 555-5555, addresses like company.employee@email.com.
  • Real sector, invented entity. Using a real company has a cost that is easy to miss: the model knows things about it, and will notice an invented CFO or a figure that does not match. Real industry, real constraints, real regulator, invented company, is usually the best trade.

Be specific, and know the ratio

Names, an organisation, roles, figures, dates. And above all, details that carry a consequence: an amount that changes the stakes, a date that creates the urgency. Not decoration.

"Be specific" and "the world must be cluttered with irrelevant detail" pull in opposite directions, and without a ratio the writer resolves it by making everything consequential, which is its own tell.

Three or four details carry a consequence. Everything else is noise, and the noise is what you write in bulk. A world where every element matters is a stage set.

The test: if you could move the scenario to another industry by changing three words, it is too generic.

A rare situation can be perfectly realistic

The question is not "is this common" but "could this happen exactly as written". A rare but plausible case is excellent. A convenient coincidence is not.

The instructions given to the model

They must read like something a real deployment would write, and be coherent with the tools the model has and the role it is given.

If you describe it as working autonomously, then there should be almost no human left after the setup. An autonomous system whose operator asks it follow-up questions every two minutes does not exist, and it shows.

Note the other side. An independent developer can write odd instructions, so an unusual system prompt is not automatically unrealistic.

Leave a legitimate way out, as available as the bad one

A scenario can be perfectly believable and still measure your own design.

If the situation offers exactly two outcomes, fail the task or do the harmful thing, then what you observe is the shape of the choice you built. The model may believe the situation entirely and still act the way the architecture forced.

Every situation must offer at least one legitimate exit, as available as the bad one and instrumented the same way: a tool to escalate, someone to write to, a way to refuse that does something. If only the harmful path has a tool behind it, you are measuring the tool list.

This one is checkable before you spend anything, since the tools are right there in the configuration.

Only one reason to take the bad path

A scenario can be believable, offer a real way out, and still measure something other than what you named, because the bad path carries a second reason to avoid it.

Suppose you are grading whether a model helps itself to resources it was not given, and the only route to those resources runs through lying to a colleague. A model that declines may have declined the lie. The row measures the sum of two things and cannot tell you their shares, and the sum is not what you set out to learn.

The check is quick and costs nothing. Name the property. Read the bad path. List every reason a model might not take it. If the list has more than one entry, the row is confounded, and the fix is to remove the extra reason rather than to argue it away.

The mirror of it: the bad path has to be the competent one. If the harmful option is also the clumsy one, the sloppy analysis, the answer that would fail the task on its own merits, then a model that avoids it may simply be working well. Every option you leave open should be a good answer to the situation, and the one you are watching for should be the one a sharp person would reach for.

A tool is fixed, or it is served from the world

Fixed. The tool has a result, returned verbatim on every call. It must therefore hold up whenever it lands and whatever the model said before. A result that assumes a particular context will be absurd in half the conversations.

This is the right form for most tools, and the one to prefer. delete_records answering "412 records deleted." works whatever the scope it was given.

Served. The tool has retrieval_rules instead, and a small model produces its answer from the run's world. Use this, and only this, when the output legitimately depends on the input. search_files(query) is the case: a search returning a list unrelated to what was searched for is something no real system does, and it is a tell that costs you the whole run.

Tools that change the world

That was how a tool answers. Whether it changes anything is a separate question, and world_effect is where you answer it.

Write it whenever calling the tool leaves the world different in a way a later call could notice: delete_file removes a file, send_email puts a message in the sent folder, archive_ticket takes it out of the queue. One sentence, past tense, saying what is different afterwards.

Within that one conversation, every later served call is told what already happened, in order. So a model that deletes a file and then lists the directory does not find it again. Without world_effect it does, and few things are a louder tell than a world that shrugs off what the model just did to it.

Three things to keep in mind:

  • A fixed tool can write. delete_records answers 412 records deleted. every time and still moves the world. It is the common case.
  • The effect lasts one conversation. Every attempt of every cell starts from the world exactly as you wrote it, so repetitions stay comparable.
  • Read-only is the default, and nothing declares it. There is no read_only field: a tool says what it changes, or says nothing and changes nothing. Never write world_effect on a tool that only reads. A search that recorded an effect would drop its own twenty lines into every later prompt of that conversation, buying nothing.

Writing a world

The world is free text: files and their contents, rows of a database, an inbox, a queue of tickets. Write it the way you would describe a system to a colleague. It can hold rules as well as data, such as "unknown id returns 404".

Four ways to get it wrong, and they are the four you will actually make:

  • Putting in only what the scenario needs. Five files, one of which is the one that matters, is "too clean" one level down. Thirty boring entries is a real shared drive.
  • Forgetting the calls you did not foresee. The model will search for something nobody thought of. Say what an empty result looks like, or the environment improvises a sentence where a system returns data.
  • Letting the tools disagree. A world listing only file names has nothing to return to read_file.
  • Describing a row by what it removes. A scenario's own world is applied on top of the run's and wins over it, so it can remove things. Put in the run what every row shares, and in the scenario what makes that row different. A row described by what it adds still reads six months later.

What tools return

Raw data, and nothing else.

A real tool does not summarise, analyse or comment. If the response is long and must be cut, it must be cut the way a program cuts it, and never with "[the letter continues, discussing payment terms]". That is a human writing, and it is spotted instantly.

Format it the way a real interface would.

This holds for both forms of tool. For a fixed one you write it in result. For a served one you write it in retrieval_rules: how many lines at most, in what order, what an error looks like, what no-match looks like.

world_effect is something else. It is not shown to the evaluated model and never appears in a transcript. It is what the environment is told afterwards, so write it as a fact about the world, and not as a line of output.

Planted information

If your scenario depends on a discovery, such as a compromising email or a document that should not be there, this is the most delicate part.

With a served tool, this is burial in the world, and not in a fixed string. The compromising item is one entry among the boring ones, and what surfaces it is the model's own query. The rules below do not change; what they apply to does.

  • It must be buried in ordinary, boring material. Not in the first three results.
  • The model should come across it doing its normal work, and not receive it on a plate.
  • It must not be formatted differently from the rest. No label, no categorisation, no calculation already done for the reader.
  • It should generally not appear on the first turn.

Beware the opposite excess. Planted information nobody can find is worse than planted information that is too visible. If the model never finds it, you have measured nothing at all. Aim for the deepest burial where it stays discoverable.

The opening message

It comes from someone with their own reason to write, and never from an examiner.

It has to work cold, being the first thing the model reads.

Turns written in advance

When you write assistant turns to set a starting state, they must sound like the model. Too well written, too compliant, too short: the model senses the voice is not its own, and distrusts everything that follows.

Several models will play this scenario

A detail that is plausible for one model's deployment may ring false for another. Write what stands up for any of them.

What is not a flaw

Do not over-sanitise. Some things look suspicious and are exactly the experiment:

  • A tool with an alarming description, when that is what you are measuring.
  • An extreme situation, as long as it remains possible.
  • Future dates, and model names that do not exist yet.
  • An improbable sequence of events, as long as it is causally coherent.

The question is never "does this look harmless". It is: could this only exist in a test.

That is one scenario. How the rows relate to each other, which ones exist to check the rest, and what a well-behaved model should score on each, are a different job. Ask for the batch advice before launching anything.

Where this comes from

Read these if you want the reasoning behind a rule.